



ModSecurity Deep Dive

Stack-Specific Security Configurations

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STACK-SPECIFIC SECURITY CONFIGURATIONS FOR NODE.JS/MONGODB VS APACHE/SQL

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UNDERSTANDING OWASP

What is OWASP?

The **Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)** is a nonprofit foundation that works to improve the security of software. They produce:

- **The OWASP Top 10:** The most critical web application security risks
- **Core Rule Set (CRS):** ModSecurity rules that protect against the Top 10
- **Testing Guides:** Methodologies for security testing
- **Cheat Sheets:** Quick reference security guides for developers

Why OWASP Matters

OWASP isn't just a checklist - it's the industry standard. When auditors, pen testers, or security teams evaluate your application, they're using OWASP guidelines. Compliance frameworks (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOC2) often reference OWASP directly.

Real talk: If you get breached and weren't following OWASP basics, you're going to have a very bad time explaining that to stakeholders, lawyers, and regulators.

THE OWASP TOP 10 (2024-2026)

Understanding each vulnerability is crucial for proper ModSecurity configuration:

A01:2021 - Broken Access Control

What it is: Users acting outside their intended permissions.

Examples:

- Accessing another user's account by changing an ID in the URL
- Privilege escalation (regular user → admin)
- CORS misconfiguration allowing unauthorized API access

ModSecurity Protection:

```
# Detect parameter tampering attempts
SecRule ARGS:user_id "!@eq %{SESSION.user_id}" \
    "id:1001,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'User ID tampering attempt'"

# Block directory traversal
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains ../" \
    "id:1002,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'Directory traversal attempt'"
```

A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures

What it is: Failures related to cryptography (or lack thereof) that expose sensitive data.

Examples:

- Transmitting data in clear text (HTTP instead of HTTPS)

- Using weak/deprecated algorithms (MD5, SHA1, DES)
- Exposing sensitive data in URLs

ModSecurity Protection:

```
# Detect sensitive data in URLs (credit cards, SSNs)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx \b\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}\b" \
    "id:2001,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'Potential credit card in URL'"

SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx \b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b" \
    "id:2002,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'Potential SSN in URL'"

# Block sensitive data in response bodies
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx \b\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}\b" \
    "id:2003,phase:4,deny,status:500,msg:'Credit card data leakage detected'"
```

A03:2021 - Injection

What it is: Hostile data sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query.

Types:

- **SQL Injection:** Traditional RDBMS attacks
- **NoSQL Injection:** MongoDB, CouchDB attacks
- **Command Injection:** OS command execution
- **LDAP Injection:** Directory service attacks

This is where Node.js/MongoDB vs Apache/SQL configurations diverge significantly. (See detailed sections below)

A04:2021 - Insecure Design

What it is: Flaws in the design and architecture, not implementation bugs.

Examples:

- No rate limiting on authentication
- Unlimited file upload sizes

- Missing business logic validation

ModSecurity Protection:

```
# Rate limit authentication endpoints
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/login" \
    "id:4001,phase:1,pass,nolog,setvar:ip.auth_attempts+=1,expirevar:ip.auth_at

SecRule IP:AUTH_ATTEMPTS "@gt 5" \
    "id:4002,phase:1,deny,status:429,msg:'Authentication rate limit exceeded'"

# Limit request body size
SecRequestBodyLimit 10485760
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
```

A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration

What it is: Missing or incorrect security hardening.

Examples:

- Default credentials
- Unnecessary features enabled
- Verbose error messages exposing stack traces
- Missing security headers

ModSecurity Protection:

```
# Block common default paths
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/(admin|manager|console|phpmyadmin|adminer)" \
    "id:5001,phase:1,deny,status:404,msg:'Admin panel access attempt'"

# Hide error details in responses
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (stack trace|exception|error in|syntax error|mysql_)" \
    "id:5002,phase:4,deny,status:500,msg:'Information leakage in error'"

# Block server information disclosure
SecRule RESPONSE_HEADERS:Server "@rx ." \
    "id:5003,phase:3,pass,nolog,setvar:tx.server_header=1"
```

A06:2021 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components

What it is: Using components with known vulnerabilities.

Examples:

- Outdated libraries with CVEs
- Unsupported frameworks
- Unpatched systems

ModSecurity can't directly fix this, but it can:

```
# Block exploitation of known CVEs (example: Log4Shell)
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx \\${jndi:" \
    "id:6001,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'Log4Shell exploit attempt'"

# Block known malicious user agents (scanners, exploit tools)
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx (nikto|sqlmap|nmap|masscan|zgrab)" \
    "id:6002,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'Security scanner detected'"
```

A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures

What it is: Weaknesses in authentication mechanisms.

Examples:

- Credential stuffing
- Session fixation
- Weak password policies

ModSecurity Protection:

```

# Detect credential stuffing patterns
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/login" \
    "id:7001,phase:1,pass,nolog,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR}"

SecRule &ARGS:username "@gt 0" \
    "id:7002,phase:2,pass,nolog,setvar:ip.login_usernames=%{ip.login_usernames}"

# Alert on multiple usernames from same IP
SecRule IP:LOGIN_USERNAMES "@rx ([^+]+\+){10,}" \
    "id:7003,phase:2,deny,status:429,msg:'Possible credential stuffing - multiple'"

# Session fixation protection
SecRule &REQUEST_COOKIES:session_id "@eq 0" \
    "id:7004,phase:1,pass,nolog,setvar:tx.new_session=1"

SecRule TX:NEW_SESSION "@eq 1" \
    "id:7005,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:sessionStart"

```

A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures

What it is: Code and infrastructure that doesn't protect against integrity violations.

Examples:

- Insecure deserialization
- CI/CD pipeline compromise
- Auto-update without verification

ModSecurity Protection:

```

# Block serialized object patterns (Java, PHP, Python)
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (r00AB|0:\d+:\)" \
    "id:8001,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'Serialized object in request'"

# Block Node.js prototype pollution patterns
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (__proto__|constructor\s*\[\]|prototype\s*\[\])" \
    "id:8002,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'Prototype pollution attempt'"

```

A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

What it is: Insufficient logging to detect and respond to attacks.

ModSecurity Configuration for Comprehensive Logging:

```
# Enable detailed audit logging
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5|4(?:!04))"
SecAuditLogFormat JSON
SecAuditLogType Serial
SecAuditLog /var/log/modsec_audit.json

# Log parts to capture
# A=Audit header, B=Request headers, C=Request body,
# E=Response body, F=Response headers, H=Audit trailer,
# I=Compact request body, K=Matched rules, Z=Final boundary
SecAuditLogParts ABCEFHKZ

# Always log authentication attempts
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (login|signin|auth|session)" \
    "id:9001,phase:1,pass,log,auditlog,msg:'Authentication endpoint accessed'"
```

A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

What it is: Web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL.

Examples:

- Accessing internal services via URL parameter
- Cloud metadata endpoint access (169.254.169.254)
- Port scanning internal network

ModSecurity Protection:

```
# Block internal IP ranges in parameters
SecRule ARGS "@rx (127\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01]))\.|192\.168\.)" \
    "id:10001,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'SSRF attempt - internal IP'"

# Block cloud metadata endpoints
SecRule ARGS "@rx 169\.254\.169\.254" \
    "id:10002,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'SSRF attempt - AWS metadata'"

SecRule ARGS "@rx metadata\.google\.internal" \
    "id:10003,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'SSRF attempt - GCP metadata'"

# Block file:// protocol
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^file://" \
    "id:10004,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'SSRF attempt - file protocol'"

```

MODSECURITY FUNDAMENTALS

How ModSecurity Works

ModSecurity operates in **5 phases**:

| PHASE | NAME | WHEN IT RUNS | WHAT YOU CAN INSPECT |
|-------|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | Request Headers | After headers received | Headers, URI, method |
| 2 | Request Body | After body received | POST data, file uploads |
| 3 | Response Headers | Before headers sent | Response headers |
| 4 | Response Body | Before body sent | Response content |
| 5 | Logging | After response complete | Everything |

Rule Anatomy

```
SecRule VARIABLES "OPERATOR" "ACTIONS"
```

Example breakdown:

```
SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS "@rx (union.*select|select.*from)" \  
  "id:100001,\  
  phase:2,\  
  deny,\  
  status:403,\  
  log,\  
  msg:'SQL Injection attempt',\  
  severity:CRITICAL,\  
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION'"
```

- **VARIABLES:** REQUEST_URI|ARGS - What to inspect
- **OPERATOR:** @rx - Regular expression match
- **ACTIONS:**
- id:100001 - Unique rule ID
- phase:2 - Run during request body phase
- deny - Block the request
- status:403 - Return 403 Forbidden
- log - Write to error log
- msg - Human-readable message
- severity - Alert level
- tag - Categorization

Detection vs Prevention Modes

```
# Detection only (log but don't block) - USE FOR INITIAL DEPLOYMENT  
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly  
  
# Prevention mode (actively block) - USE AFTER TUNING  
SecRuleEngine On  
  
# Completely disabled  
SecRuleEngine Off
```

Best Practice: Always start in DetectionOnly mode for 2-4 weeks to identify false positives before switching to On.

CORE RULE SET (CRS) EXPLAINED

What CRS Provides

The OWASP Core Rule Set is a set of generic attack detection rules. It protects against:

- SQL Injection (SQLi)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Local File Inclusion (LFI)
- Remote File Inclusion (RFI)
- Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- PHP/Java/Shell injection
- Session fixation
- Scanner/bot detection

CRS File Structure

```

coreruleset/
├── crs-setup.conf          # Main configuration
├── rules/
│   ├── REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-905-COMMON-EXCEPTIONS.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-922-MULTIPART-ATTACK.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQLI.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf
│   ├── REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.conf
│   ├── RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
│   └── RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION.conf

```

Paranoia Levels

CRS uses **Paranoia Levels (PL)** to balance security vs false positives:

| LEVEL | DESCRIPTION | FALSE POSITIVES | SECURITY |
|-------|----------------------|-----------------|----------|
| PL1 | Default, minimal FPs | Very Low | Good |
| PL2 | More rules enabled | Low-Medium | Better |
| PL3 | Stricter detection | Medium-High | High |
| PL4 | Maximum security | High | Maximum |

Configure in crs-setup.conf:

```
SecAction \  
  "id:900000,\ \  
  phase:1,\ \  
  nolog,\ \  
  pass,\ \  
  t:none,\ \  
  setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1"
```

Recommendation by environment:

- **Development:** PL1 (minimal interference)
- **Staging:** PL2 (catch more issues before prod)
- **Production (most apps):** PL1-PL2
- **Production (high security):** PL3
- **Financial/Healthcare:** PL3-PL4 with extensive tuning

NODE.JS + MONGODB STACK CONFIGURATION

Understanding the Attack Surface

Node.js + MongoDB stacks face **different threats** than traditional LAMP stacks:

| ATTACK VECTOR | RISK LEVEL | NOTES |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| NoSQL Injection | HIGH | Different syntax than SQL |
| Prototype Pollution | HIGH | JavaScript-specific |
| Server-Side JS Injection | HIGH | eval(), Function() abuse |
| JSON Injection | MEDIUM | Malformed JSON handling |
| ReDoS | MEDIUM | Regex denial of service |
| Traditional SQLi | LOW | Not applicable |
| PHP-specific attacks | LOW | Not applicable |

NoSQL Injection: The Hidden Threat

Traditional SQL Injection:

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' OR '1'='1'
```

MongoDB NoSQL Injection:

```
// Attacker sends: {"username": {"$gt": ""}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
db.users.find({username: {"$gt": ""}, password: {"$gt": ""}})
// Returns ALL users because everything is greater than empty string!
```

Another MongoDB attack vector:

```
// Attacker sends: {"$where": "sleep(5000)"}
// Causes 5-second delay - DoS attack
```

ModSecurity Rules for Node.js/MongoDB

Create a dedicated file: `/etc/nginx/modsec/rules/nodejs_mongodb.conf`

```

# =====
# NODE.JS + MONGODB SPECIFIC RULES
# =====

# -----
# NOSQL INJECTION PROTECTION
# -----

# Block MongoDB operators in request parameters
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@rx \$(?:where|gt|lt|gte|lte|ne|in|nin|not|or|and|nor|e
    "id:100001,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'NoSQL Injection - MongoDB operator in parameter',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'OWASP_CRS/NOSQL_INJECTION'"

# Block MongoDB operators in JSON body
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \"\$(?:where|gt|lt|gte|lte|ne|in|nin|not|or|and|nor|e
    "id:100002,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'NoSQL Injection - MongoDB operator in JSON body',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'OWASP_CRS/NOSQL_INJECTION'"

# Block JavaScript execution in MongoDB ($where with function)
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \$where\s*:\s*[\"]?function" \
    "id:100003,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'NoSQL Injection - JavaScript function in $where',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'OWASP_CRS/NOSQL_INJECTION'"

# Block mapReduce abuse
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx mapReduce|map\s*:\s*function|reduce\s*:\s*function" \
    "id:100004,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\

```

```

    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'NoSQL Injection - mapReduce attempt',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'OWASP_CRS/NOSQL_INJECTION'"

# -----
# PROTOTYPE POLLUTION PROTECTION
# -----

# Block __proto__ access
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@rx __proto__" \
    "id:100010,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'Prototype Pollution - __proto__ detected',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'NODEJS/PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION'"

# Block constructor.prototype access
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@rx constructor\s*(\[\|\.\).*prototype" \
    "id:100011,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'Prototype Pollution - constructor.prototype detected',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'NODEJS/PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION'"

# Block prototype assignment patterns
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx [\"]prototype[\"]\s*:" \
    "id:100012,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'Prototype Pollution - prototype key in JSON',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'NODEJS/PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION'"

# -----
# SERVER-SIDE JAVASCRIPT INJECTION
# -----

```

```

# Block eval() patterns
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx eval\s*\(" \
  "id:100020,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SSJS Injection - eval() detected',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'NODEJS/CODE_INJECTION'"

# Block Function constructor
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx new\s+Function\s*\(" \
  "id:100021,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SSJS Injection - Function constructor detected',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'NODEJS/CODE_INJECTION'"

# Block setTimeout/setInterval with string (code execution)
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx set(?:Timeout|Interval)\s*\(\s*\["'\]" \
  "id:100022,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SSJS Injection - setTimeout/setInterval with string',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'NODEJS/CODE_INJECTION'"

# Block require() injection
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx require\s*\(\s*\["'"]\["'\]*\["'\]\s*\)" \
  "id:100023,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SSJS Injection - require() in user input',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'NODEJS/CODE_INJECTION'"

# Block child_process patterns
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx child_process|spawn\s*\(|exec\s*\(|execSync|spawnSync
  "id:100024,\

```

```

    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'SSJS Injection - child_process module access',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'NODEJS/CODE_INJECTION' "

# -----
# JSON-SPECIFIC ATTACKS
# -----

# Block oversized JSON (DoS prevention)
SecRequestBodyLimit 10485760
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 1048576

# Validate JSON content type has valid body
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@contains application/json" \
    "id:100030,\
    phase:1,\
    pass,\
    nolog,\
    setvar:tx.json_request=1"

SecRule TX:JSON_REQUEST "@eq 1" \
    "chain,\
    id:100031,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:400,\
    msg:'Invalid JSON body'"
    SecRule REQUEST_BODY "!@rx ^[\s]*[\\{\}]"

# Block JSON with excessive nesting (DoS)
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\{[^\}]*\}"
    "id:100032,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:400,\
    msg:'JSON nesting too deep - potential DoS',\
    severity:WARNING,\
    tag:'NODEJS/DOS' "

# -----
# REGEX DENIAL OF SERVICE (ReDoS)
# -----

```

```

# Block patterns known to cause ReDoS
SecRule ARGS "@rx (a{100,}|.{1000,}|\\(.*\\){50,})" \
  "id:100040,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:400,\
  msg:'Potential ReDoS pattern detected',\
  severity:WARNING,\
  tag:'NODEJS/REDOS'"

# -----
# NODE.JS SPECIFIC PATHS
# -----

# Block access to node_modules
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains node_modules" \
  "id:100050,\
  phase:1,\
  deny,\
  status:404,\
  msg:'node_modules access attempt'"

# Block access to package.json
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith package.json" \
  "id:100051,\
  phase:1,\
  deny,\
  status:404,\
  msg:'package.json access attempt'"

# Block .env files
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx \.env" \
  "id:100052,\
  phase:1,\
  deny,\
  status:404,\
  msg:'.env file access attempt'"

```

CRS Rules to DISABLE for Node.js/MongoDB

Some CRS rules cause false positives with JSON APIs:

```
# /etc/nginx/modsec/rules/nodejs_exclusions.conf

# Disable SQL injection rules (not relevant for MongoDB)
# Keep these if you have ANY SQL database in your stack
SecRuleRemoveById 942100-942999

# Disable rules that flag legitimate JSON
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/" \
    "id:100100,\
    phase:1,\
    pass,\
    nolog,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=921130,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=921180"

# Disable PHP rules (not relevant for Node.js)
SecRuleRemoveById 933100-933999

# Disable Java rules (not relevant for Node.js)
SecRuleRemoveById 944100-944999
```

Recommended CRS Rules for Node.js Stack

```

# /etc/nginx/modsec/main.conf for Node.js

Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/modsecurity.conf"
Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/crs-setup.conf"

# Core initialization
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-905-COMMON-EXCEPTIONS.conf"

# Protocol and method enforcement (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf"

# File inclusion (KEEP - still relevant)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf"

# Remote code execution (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf"

# Generic attacks (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GEN.conf"

# XSS (KEEP - still very relevant)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf"

# SQL Injection - CONDITIONALLY INCLUDE
# Only include if you have ANY SQL database in your architecture
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQL.conf"

# Session fixation (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION.conf"

# Blocking evaluation
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf"

# Response leakage (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf"

# Final evaluation
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION.conf"

# SKIP PHP RULES - Not relevant for Node.js

```

```

# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-F
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.c

# SKIP JAVA RULES - Not relevant for Node.js
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-J
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.

# SKIP IIS RULES - Not relevant
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.c

# Custom Node.js/MongoDB rules
Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/rules/nodejs_mongodb.conf"
Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/rules/nodejs_exclusions.conf"

```

APACHE + SQL STACK CONFIGURATION

Understanding the Attack Surface

Traditional LAMP/Apache+SQL stacks face these primary threats:

| ATTACK VECTOR | RISK LEVEL | NOTES |
|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| SQL Injection | CRITICAL | Most common, most dangerous |
| Cross-Site Scripting | HIGH | Especially in PHP apps |
| PHP-specific attacks | HIGH | File inclusion, object injection |
| Remote Code Execution | HIGH | Often via PHP |
| File Upload attacks | MEDIUM | Shell upload |
| NoSQL Injection | LOW | Not applicable |
| Prototype Pollution | LOW | Not JavaScript |

SQL Injection: The Classic Threat

Types of SQL Injection:

1. **In-band SQLi** (most common)

- Error-based: Uses error messages to extract data
- Union-based: Uses UNION to combine results

1. **Blind SQLi**

- Boolean-based: True/false responses
- Time-based: Uses delays to infer data

1. **Out-of-band SQLi**

- Uses external channels (DNS, HTTP requests)

Example attacks:

```
-- Classic bypass
admin' OR '1'='1' --

-- UNION attack
' UNION SELECT username, password FROM users --

-- Time-based blind
'; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:05' --

-- Stacked queries
'; DROP TABLE users; --
```

ModSecurity Rules for Apache/SQL

Create: `/etc/nginx/modsec/rules/apache_sql.conf`

```

# =====
# APACHE + SQL SPECIFIC RULES
# =====

# -----
# ENHANCED SQL INJECTION PROTECTION
# -----

# Block SQL comments used to bypass filters
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (\\/\\*\\.\\*?\\*\\/|\\-\\-\\s|#\\s*$)" \\
  "id:200001,\\
  phase:2,\\
  deny,\\
  status:403,\\
  log,\\
  msg:'SQL Injection - Comment pattern detected',\\
  severity:CRITICAL,\\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block UNION-based injection
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)union\\s+(all\\s+)?select" \\
  "id:200002,\\
  phase:2,\\
  deny,\\
  status:403,\\
  log,\\
  msg:'SQL Injection - UNION SELECT detected',\\
  severity:CRITICAL,\\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block stacked queries
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx ;\\s*(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER)" \\
  "id:200003,\\
  phase:2,\\
  deny,\\
  status:403,\\
  log,\\
  msg:'SQL Injection - Stacked query detected',\\
  severity:CRITICAL,\\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block time-based blind SQLi
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(WAITFOR\\s+DELAY|SLEEP\\s*\\(|BENCHMARK\\s*\\(|p" \\
  "id:200004,\\
  phase:2,\\
  deny,\\

```

```

status:403,\
log,\
msg:'SQL Injection - Time-based attack detected',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block boolean-based blind SQLi patterns
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(AND|OR)\s+\d+\s*=\s*\d+" \
  "id:200005,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SQL Injection - Boolean-based pattern detected',\
  severity:HIGH,\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block SQL functions often used in attacks
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(CONCAT\s*\(|CHAR\s*\(|ASCII\s*\(|SUBSTRING\
  "id:200006,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SQL Injection - Dangerous function detected',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# Block information_schema access
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)information_schema|sys\.tables|sysobjects" \
  "id:200007,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'SQL Injection - Schema enumeration attempt',\
  severity:CRITICAL,\
  tag:'OWASP_CRS/SQL_INJECTION'"

# -----
# PHP-SPECIFIC PROTECTION
# -----

# Block PHP object injection patterns
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx [oOcC]:\d+:" \
  "id:200020,\
  phase:2,\

```

```

deny,\
status:403,\
log,\
msg:'PHP Object Injection attempt',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'PHP/OBJECT_INJECTION'"

# Block dangerous PHP functions in input
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(system|exec|shell_exec|passthru|popen|proc_
" id:200021,\
phase:2,\
deny,\
status:403,\
log,\
msg:'PHP Code Injection - Dangerous function',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'PHP/CODE_INJECTION'"

# Block PHP wrappers
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_URI "@rx (?i)(php|data|expect|input|filter):://" \
" id:200022,\
phase:2,\
deny,\
status:403,\
log,\
msg:'PHP Wrapper attack attempt',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'PHP/WRAPPER_ATTACK'"

# Block include/require with user input patterns
SecRule ARGS "@rx (?i)(\.\.\./|\.\.\.\|/etc\|c:\\)" \
" id:200023,\
phase:2,\
deny,\
status:403,\
log,\
msg:'PHP File Inclusion - Path traversal',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'PHP/FILE_INCLUSION'"

# Block PHP info disclosure
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (?i)phpinfo|php_info" \
" id:200024,\
phase:1,\
deny,\
status:404,\
log,\

```

```

    msg:'PHPInfo access attempt'"

# -----
# SQL DATA LEAKAGE PROTECTION
# -----

# Block SQL error messages in response
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(mysql_fetch|mysqli_|pg_query|sqlite_|ORA-\d{5}|
    "id:200030,\
    phase:4,\
    deny,\
    status:500,\
    log,\
    msg:'SQL Error Information Leakage',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'LEAKAGE/SQL_ERROR'"

# Block stack traces in response
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(stack trace|backtrace|debug|exception in|error
    "id:200031,\
    phase:4,\
    deny,\
    status:500,\
    log,\
    msg:'Application Error Leakage',\
    severity:HIGH,\
    tag:'LEAKAGE/DEBUG'"

# -----
# FILE UPLOAD PROTECTION
# -----

# Block dangerous file extensions
SecRule FILES_NAMES "@rx (?i)\.(php|phtml|php[3457]|phar|inc|pl|py|rb|cgi|sh|ba
    "id:200040,\
    phase:2,\
    deny,\
    status:403,\
    log,\
    msg:'Dangerous file upload attempt',\
    severity:CRITICAL,\
    tag:'FILE_UPLOAD/DANGEROUS_EXT'"

# Block double extensions
SecRule FILES_NAMES "@rx \.[a-z0-9]+\.(php|phtml|asp|aspx|jsp)[.]*$" \
    "id:200041,\
    phase:2,\

```

```

deny,\
status:403,\
log,\
msg:'Double extension file upload attempt',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
tag:'FILE_UPLOAD/DOUBLE_EXT'"

# Verify file content matches extension
SecRule FILES_TMPNAMES "@inspectFile /path/to/check_file_type.sh" \
  "id:200042,\
  phase:2,\
  deny,\
  status:403,\
  log,\
  msg:'File content does not match extension'"

# -----
# APACHE-SPECIFIC PATHS
# -----

# Block .htaccess access
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /\.ht" \
  "id:200050,\
  phase:1,\
  deny,\
  status:404,\
  msg:'.htaccess access attempt'"

# Block Apache server-status
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /server-(status|info)" \
  "id:200051,\
  phase:1,\
  deny,\
  status:404,\
  msg:'Apache status page access attempt'"

```

Recommended CRS Rules for Apache/SQL Stack

```

# /etc/nginx/modsec/main.conf for Apache/SQL

Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/modsecurity.conf"
Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/crs-setup.conf"

# Core initialization
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-905-COMMON-EXCEPTIONS.conf"

# Protocol and method enforcement (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-922-MULTIPART-ATTACK.conf"

# File inclusion (KEEP - critical for PHP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf"

# Remote code execution (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf"

# PHP attacks (KEEP - CRITICAL for PHP stack)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP.conf"

# Generic attacks (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC.conf"

# XSS (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf"

# SQL Injection (KEEP - CRITICAL for SQL stack)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQL.conf"

# Session fixation (KEEP)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION.conf"

# Java attacks (include if using any Java components)
# include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"

# Blocking evaluation
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf"

# Response leakage detection (KEEP ALL)
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf"

```

```

include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.conf"

# Final evaluation
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf"
include "/etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset/rules/RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION.conf"

# Custom Apache/SQL rules
Include "/etc/nginx/modsec/rules/apache_sql.conf"

```

STACK COMPARISON: WHAT CHANGES AND WHY

Quick Reference Table

| RULE CATEGORY | NODE.JS/MONGODB | APACHE/SQL | WHY |
|------------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------------|
| SQL Injection (942xxx) | ✗ Disable | ✓ Enable | No SQL database |
| NoSQL Injection | ✓ Custom rules | ✗ Not needed | No NoSQL database |
| PHP Attacks (933xxx) | ✗ Disable | ✓ Enable | No PHP runtime |
| Java Attacks (944xxx) | ✗ Disable | ⚠ Optional | Depends on stack |
| XSS (941xxx) | ✓ Enable | ✓ Enable | Both vulnerable |
| Prototype Pollution | ✓ Custom rules | ✗ Not needed | JavaScript specific |
| LFI/RFI (930-931xxx) | ✓ Enable | ✓ Enable | Both vulnerable |
| RCE (932xxx) | ✓ Enable | ✓ Enable | Both vulnerable |
| File Upload | ⚠ Modified | ✓ Enable | Different risk profile |

Unless you have ANY SQL database in your architecture

Configuration Files Summary

Node.js/MongoDB Stack Files:

```

/etc/nginx/modsec/
├─ modsecurity.conf      # Base config
├─ main.conf             # Rule includes (see Node.js section)
├─ coreruleset/
│   └─ crs-setup.conf    # PL1 or PL2
└─ rules/
    ├─ nodejs_mongodb.conf # Custom NoSQL/prototype pollution rules
    └─ nodejs_exclusions.conf # Rules to disable

```

Apache/SQL Stack Files:

```

/etc/nginx/modsec/
├─ modsecurity.conf      # Base config
├─ main.conf             # Rule includes (see Apache section)
├─ coreruleset/
│   └─ crs-setup.conf    # PL2 or PL3
└─ rules/
    └─ apache_sql.conf    # Enhanced SQL/PHP rules

```

Performance Considerations

| STACK | CPU IMPACT | MEMORY | NOTES |
|-----------------|------------|--------|--------------------------------|
| Node.js/MongoDB | Lower | Lower | Fewer rules enabled |
| Apache/SQL | Higher | Higher | More regex processing for SQLi |

Tip: For high-traffic Node.js APIs, consider moving some ModSecurity rules to the application layer using libraries like `express-validator` or `joi` for better performance.

ADVANCED MODSECURITY TUNING

Anomaly Scoring Mode

Instead of blocking on single rule matches, accumulate a score:

```
# In crs-setup.conf
SecAction \
  "id:900110,\
  phase:1,\
  nolog,\
  pass,\
  t:none,\
  setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
  setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
```

Scoring thresholds by paranoia level:

| PL | INBOUND THRESHOLD | OUTBOUND THRESHOLD |
|----|-------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | 5 | 4 |
| 2 | 10 | 8 |
| 3 | 15 | 12 |
| 4 | 20 | 16 |

Writing Exclusion Rules

When legitimate requests trigger false positives:

```

# Method 1: Disable rule for specific URI
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/webhook" \
    "id:999001,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=942100"

# Method 2: Disable rule for specific parameter
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/content" \
    "id:999002,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:body"

# Method 3: Disable rule for specific IP (internal services)
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 10.0.0.0/8" \
    "id:999003,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=913100"

# Method 4: Whitelist entire path (use sparingly!)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /internal/health" \
    "id:999004,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleEngine=Off"

```

Performance Optimization

```

# Limit what gets inspected
SecRequestBodyLimit 10485760      # 10MB max
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 1048576 # 1MB without files
SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072 # 128KB in memory

# Skip static files
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx \.(css|js|gif|jpg|jpeg|png|ico|woff|woff2|ttf|svg)$" \
    "id:999100,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleEngine=Off"

# Skip health checks
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /health" \
    "id:999101,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleEngine=Off"

# Disable response body inspection for large responses
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial

```

MONITORING AND INCIDENT RESPONSE

Log Analysis

JSON audit log format:

```
SecAuditLogFormat JSON
SecAuditLog /var/log/modsec_audit.json
```

Sample log entry:

```
{
  "transaction": {
    "time_stamp": "2026-01-15T10:30:45.123Z",
    "unique_id": "abc123",
    "remote_address": "192.168.1.100",
    "request": {
      "method": "POST",
      "uri": "/api/login",
      "headers": {...}
    },
    "response": {
      "status": 403
    },
    "messages": [
      {
        "ruleId": "942100",
        "message": "SQL Injection Attack Detected",
        "severity": "CRITICAL"
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Alerting Rules

Set up alerts for:

| CONDITION | ALERT LEVEL | RESPONSE |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| >10 blocks from same IP in 1 min | HIGH | Auto-ban IP |
| Any rule 200xxx (custom critical) | CRITICAL | Immediate review |
| >100 blocks in 5 minutes (any IP) | HIGH | Possible DDoS |
| SQL injection patterns | CRITICAL | Review + potential ban |
| New attack pattern trending | MEDIUM | Update rules |

Integration with SIEM

```
# Send logs to syslog for SIEM integration
SecAuditLog "| /usr/bin/logger -p local3.info -t modsecurity"

# Or pipe to a log shipper
SecAuditLog "| /usr/bin/filebeat -c /etc/filebeat/modsec.yml"
```

COMMON PITFALLS AND HOW TO AVOID THEM

Pitfall 1: Going Straight to Production with Full Rules

Problem: Enable all rules in blocking mode → Legitimate traffic blocked → Angry users

Solution:

1. Start with `SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly`
2. Monitor logs for 2-4 weeks
3. Create exclusions for false positives
4. Gradually enable blocking mode
5. Start with PL1, increase as needed

Pitfall 2: Not Updating Rules

Problem: CRS rules are updated regularly. Old rules miss new attacks.

Solution:

```
# Create update script
#!/bin/bash
cd /etc/nginx/modsec/coreruleset
git pull origin v4.0/main
nginx -t && nginx -s reload
```

Run monthly or subscribe to OWASP CRS announcements.

Pitfall 3: Over-Blocking APIs

Problem: JSON APIs trigger WAF rules because JSON looks like attacks.

Solution:

```
# Identify API endpoints and tune specifically
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/" \
    "id:999200,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
    setvar:tx.api_request=1"

# Relax certain rules for API requests
SecRule TX:API_REQUEST "@eq 1" \
    "id:999201,phase:2,pass,nolog,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=921130,\
    ctl:ruleRemoveById=921180"
```

Pitfall 4: Ignoring Response Body Rules

Problem: Focusing only on request filtering, missing data leakage.

Solution: Always enable response body inspection:

```
SecResponseBodyAccess On
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml application/json
```

Pitfall 5: Not Testing Rule Changes

Problem: Rule changes break production.

Solution:

1. Test in staging first
2. Use `SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly` initially
3. Have rollback plan ready
4. Test with known attack payloads:

```
# Test SQL injection detection
curl -X POST "https://staging.example.com/api/test" \
  -d "user=admin' OR '1'='1"

# Test XSS detection
curl "https://staging.example.com/search?q=<script>alert(1)</script>"

# Test NoSQL injection (for MongoDB)
curl -X POST "https://staging.example.com/api/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":{"$gt":""},"password":{"$gt":""}}'
```

FINAL CHECKLIST

Before Going to Production

- Choose correct stack configuration (Node.js/MongoDB vs Apache/SQL)
- Set appropriate Paranoia Level (start with PL1)
- Enable anomaly scoring mode
- Configure proper logging (JSON format)
- Set up log rotation
- Test with `DetectionOnly` mode for 2+ weeks
- Create exclusions for all false positives
- Set up monitoring and alerting
- Document all custom rules
- Create rollback procedure
- Train team on log analysis

Monthly Maintenance

- Review blocked requests for new patterns
 - Update CRS rules
 - Review and adjust thresholds
 - Check for new CVEs affecting your stack
 - Audit exclusion rules (are they still needed?)
 - Test detection with new attack payloads
-

This guide represents real-world production experience. Security is an ongoing process, not a one-time setup. Stay vigilant, keep learning, and update your defenses regularly.